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Abstract
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Wireless Jamming Detection in Vehicular Networks Using Machine
Learning and Cross-Layer Data
by Dimitrios KARAGIANNIS
Wireless communications are vulnerable against radio frequency (RF) jam-
ming which might be caused either intentionally or unintentionally. A par-
ticular subset of wireless networks, the vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANET),
that incorporate a series of safety-critical applications, may be a potential
target of RF jamming with detrimental safety effects. To ensure secure com-
munication and defend it against this type of attacks, an accurate detection
scheme must be adopted.
This work studies the detection of such attacks leveraging the use of unsu-
pervised and supervised machine learning techniques. The machine learning
algorithms, K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Random Forest (RF) (supervised
algorithms) and K-means (unsupervised algorithm), utilize a series of fea-
tures among which is the metric of the variations of relative speed (VRS)
between the jammer and the receiver that is passively estimated from the
combined value of the valuable and the jamming signal at the receiver. To
the best of our knowledge, this metric has never been utilized before in a
machine-learning detection scheme in the literature. Through clustering and
classification, as well as with the utilization of the VRS feature, we are able
to efficiently detect various cases of Denial of Service (DoS) jamming attacks,
differentiate them from cases of interference as well as forsee a potential dan-
ger sucessfully and act accordingly.
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ΠΑΝΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΙΟ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΙΑΣ
Περίληψη
ΠΟΛΥΤΕΧΝΙΚΗ ΣΧΟΛΗ
Τμήμα Ηλεκτρολόγων Μηχανικών και Μηχανικών Η/Υ
Master of Science
Εpiιστήμη και Τεχνολογία ΗΜΜΥ
Μελέτη Ανίχνευσης Εpiιθέσεων με Χρήση Διαστρωματικών Δεδομένων και
Τεχνικές Μηχανικής Μάθησης σε Δίκτυα Κινούμενων Κόμβων
by Δημήτριος ΚΑΡΑΓΙΑΝΝΗΣ
Οι ασύρματες εpiικοινωνίες είναι ευάλωτες σε εpiιθέσεις piαρεμβολών (radio fre-
quency (RF) jamming) piου μpiορεί να piροκληθούν είτε σκόpiιμα είτε ακούσια.
΄Ενα συγκεκριμένο υpiοσύνολο ασύρματων δικτύων, τα αυτοοργανωμένα (ad-hoc)
δίκτυα οχημάτων (VANET), piου ενσωματώνουν μια σειρά εφαρμογών κρίσιμης
σημασίας για την ασφάλεια, μpiορεί να είναι ένας piιθανός στόχος piαρεμβολών
με εpiιβλαβή αpiοτελέσματα ασφάλειας. Προκειμένου να διασφαλιστεί η ασφαλής
εpiικοινωνία και να piροασpiιστεί αpiό αυτού του είδους τις εpiιθέσεις, piρέpiει να
υιοθετηθεί ένα ακριβές σύστημα ανίχνευσης.
Η piαρούσα εργασία μελετά την ανίχνευση τέτοιων εpiιθέσεων αξιοpiοιώντας τη
χρήση μη εpiοpiτευόμενων και εpiοpiτευόμενων τεχνικών μηχανικής μάθησης. Οι
αλγόριθμοι μηχανικής μάθησης, k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Random Forests
(RF) (τεχνικές εpiοpiτευόμενης μηχανικής μάθησης) και K-means (τεχνική μη εpiο-
piτευόμενης μηχανικής μάθησης) χρησιμοpiοιούν μια σειρά αpiό μετρικές μεταξύ των
οpiοίων είναι η μέτρηση των μεταβολών της σχετικής ταχύτητας (VRS) ανάμεσα
στον piαρεμβολέα και στον δέκτη, η οpiοία εκτιμάται piαθητικά αpiό τη συνδυασμένη
τιμή του piολύτιμου και του σήματος piαρεμβολής στον δέκτη. Αpiό όσο μας ε-
ίναι γνωστό, αυτή η μετρική δεν έχει χρησιμοpiοιηθεί piοτέ piριν σε αντίστοιχη
piροσpiάθεια ανίχνευσης εpiιθέσεων piαρεμβολής με χρήση μηχανικής μάθησης στη
βιβλιογραφία. Μέσω της ομαδοpiοίησης και της ταξινόμησης, καθώς και με τη
χρήση της piροτεινόμενης μετρικής VRS, είμαστε σε θέση να ανιχνεύσουμε αpiο-
τελεσματικά διάφορες piεριpiτώσεις εpiιθέσεων piαρεμβολής με στόχο την άρνηση
υpiηρεσίας (DoS εpiιθέσεις), να τις διαφοροpiοιήσουμε αpiό piεριpiτώσεις ακούσιας
piαρεμβολής καθώς και να piροβλέψουμε εpiιτυχώς έναν piιθανό κίνδυνο ώστε να
ενεργήσουμε αναλόγως.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Vehicular Communications
Autonomous vehicles capable of navigating unpredictable real-world envi-
ronments with little human feedback are a reality today [1]. Autonomous
vehicle control imposes very strict requirements on the security of the wire-
less communication channels [11], [30] used by the fleet of vehicles, in order
for them to exchange information and remain connected [5]. The Intelli-
gent Vehicle Grid technology is introduced in [9], in which the car becomes
a formidable sensor platform, absorbing information from the environment
or from other cars (and from the driver) and feeding it to other vehicles and
infrastructure so as to assist in safe navigation, pollution control and traf-
fic management. The Vehicle Grid essentially becomes an Internet of Things
(IOT), which we call Internet of Vehicles (IOV), capable of making its own
decisions in driving customers to their destinations [12].
Wireless communications, however, are vulnerable against a wide range
of attacks [20]. An attack that is particularly hard to detect in every wire-
less network is the RF jamming attack [7]. In a VANET, attack detection is
even more difficult due to the constant and rapid changes in topology and
the high mobility of the nodes as well as due to the presence of a variety of
different jammers [23] affecting either the communication between vehicles
(V2V communication) or the communication between the vehicles and the
roadside units, namely RSUs (V2R communication).
Over the last few years, there have been several experimental approaches
for jamming detection [3], [7], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [32], some of which
suggest the use of machine learning [6], [19]. All the above works that pro-
pose machine-learning based schemes, do not utilize the relative speed, which
is a metric of the application layer. In a few cases this metric is used in the
training procedure with it’s value being measured by sensors. The estima-
tion of the relative speed metric from the wireless medium is not used from
previous works mainly because of the fact that vehicular wireless channels
exhibit specific characteristics (i.e. rapidly changing vehicular channels) that
make them quite different from the very well defined mobile telephony chan-
nels. However with our work, we prove that this metric can be utilized in a
realistic scenario with a minimum number of assumptions.
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Chapter 1. Introduction 2
1.2 Thesis Motivation and Contribution
The successful and on-time apprehension and avoidance of a real jamming
attack could prove to be crucial in an urban environment for the preservation
of the safety. Additionally, the differentiation between intentional jamming
and interference - that is unintentional jamming - is also very important as
a different defencive behavior could be adopted in each case. In the case of
interference, an Interference Cancellation (IC) model [2], a spectral evasion
(channel surfing) or a spatial evasion (spatial retreats) scheme combined with
adjusting resources, such as power levels and communication coding, could
be adopted to preserve communication [24]. On the other hand, in the case
of a jamming attack, a different approach, such as the Hideaway Strategy [3]
must be adopted as the previously described solutions would not be effec-
tive against a real and persistent jammer. For the validation of the proposed
approach, one interference-only scenario and two jamming attack scenarios
have been created and tested.
This work focuses on the detection of possible RF jamming attacks - aim-
ing at disrupting the communication of the nodes in a VANET - in an urban
area and their differentiation from unintentional jamming (interference), us-
ing supervised and unsupervised machine learning techniques, that, as it
is already stated, has not been closely examined by previous works. Apart
from the utilization of machine leraning, we use a series of cross-layer met-
rics in addition to our new, variations of relative speed (VRS), metric, so as
to make the detection process more robust agaist different types of jamming,
intentional or unintenional.
The contribution of this thesis is three-fold:
• A novel detection scheme is introduced that leverages a new metric,
namely the variations of relative speed (VRS) that, to the best of our knowl-
edge, has never been used in literature before in supervised or unsuper-
vised machine learning-based jamming attack detection approaches.
• A completely passive scheme is utilized using the combined received
signal at the receiver, without hardware or computational cost. The
scheme first estimates the combined channel of the transmitter - re-
ceiver (Tx − Rx) and second the channel of the jammer - receiver (Jx −
Rx). It then estimates the relative speed between the jammer and the
receiver using the RF Doppler shift.
• Based on a series of cross-layer data (among which is the VRS metric
that is calculated using the estimated relative speed) detection of a po-
tential threat as well as differentiation between a case of jamming and
a case of interference is achieved.
1.3 Structure
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview
of the related work in the domain of attack (not only jamming) detection
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Chapter 1. Introduction 3
as well as some basic concepts, Chapter 3 describes the adopted topology
and the channel model, Chapter 4 presents the proposed machine-learning
based jamming detection system for both supervised and unsupervised ap-
proaches, Chapter 5 describes the simulation setup, Chapter 6 presents the
experimental results and comparisons and Chapter 7 summarizes the signif-
icance of our approach and concludes this work.
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4Chapter 2
Related Work and Basic Concepts
2.1 Related Work
The most important machine-learning based approaches for RF jamming at-
tack detection in vehicular ad-hoc networks have been reported in [19] and [6].
Grover et al. [6] propose a machine learning approach to classify multi-
ple misbehaviors in VANET using concrete and behavioral features for each
node that sends safety packets. However, features related to the verification
of geographical position, such as speed, are only required to classify position
and identity spoofing (Sybil) attacks.
Puñal et al. [19] use several channel- Noise and Channel Busy Ratio (CBR),
performance - Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) and Maximum Inactive Time
(Max IT)- and signal- Received Signal Strength (RSS)- metrics to perform
an attack detection utilizing machine learning techniques and examining the
cases of reactive and constant jammers.
Azogu et al. [3] have implemented a new mechanism, called Hideaway
Strategy which uses the Packet Sending Ratio (PSR) and according to which
all nodes should remain silent while the network is under a jamming attack.
Bißmeyer et al. [4] propose a detection scheme that is based on the verifi-
cation of vehicle movement data and on the notion that a certain space will
be occupied by only one vehicle at a certain time.
Hamieh et al. [7] focus on the detection of the reactive jammer. The pro-
posed method, is based on the correlation coefficient (CC) and the error prob-
ability (EP). Each node compares the calculated value of CC with the EP and
the network is considered under a jamming attack if CC>EP.
Malebary et al. [15] propose a two-phase jamming detection method that
utilizes metrics such as the RSS, the Packet Delivery/Send Ratio (PDSR) and
the Packet Loss Ratio (PLR) as well consistency checks to distinguish a jam-
ming from a no-jamming situation.
Mokdad et al. [16], [17] propose a scheme for detecting a jamming at-
tack in vehicular ad-hoc networks that depends on the variations of the PDR.
The approach is based on the premise that only packets that derive from the
sender are allowed through the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and that
the PDR is equal to the ratio of these packets and the total number of packets
received.
Puñal et al. [18] create a set of jammers and implement a variety of jam-
ming scenarios, both indoor and outdoor, under different jamming behaviors
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(constant, reactive and pilot jamming) in order to address the impact of a RF
jammer in VANET communications.
Quyoom et al. [20] and RoselinMary et al. [21] present an approach that is
based on the detection of malicious and irrelevant packets using the number
of broadcast packets per second (frequency) and the velocity of the vehicle
that the packets are sent from.
Shafiq et al. [22] propose an attack detection approach based on the num-
ber of packets that are received from each vehicle, thus indicating an attack
if this number is greater than the threshold value.
Xu et al. [32] state the inability of the PDR to differentiate jamming from
interference cases. For that reason, two detection schemes are proposed. The
first one utilizes signal strength measurements as a consistency check to de-
termine if the PDR value is due to jamming or interference. The second uses
location information as the consistency check. Several jamming attack mod-
els are presented and evaluated.
Amoozadeh et al. [1] study the case of Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Con-
trol through the illustration and simulation of a series of different layer at-
tacks as well as their countermeasures, that can affect the VANET communi-
cation of the connected vehicles.
Sharanya et al. [25] propose the use of the Support Vector Machine (SVM)
algorithm with Modified Fading Memory (MFM) so as to classify legitimate
and malicious nodes. The purpose of the MFM is to reduce the computa-
tional overhead for the machine learning algorithm by only considering as
eligible nodes those in the range of the VANET communication.
In all the prior works in which machine-learning based schemes are pro-
posed, the metric of the relative speed and its variations is not utilized. In a
few cases this metric is utilized in training with it’s value being measured by
sensors. In our work, the estimation of the relative speed is achieved with the
use of the RF communication between jammer and receiver, the variations of
which are used as an extra feature in the classification and clustering process.
2.2 VANET
VANET can be described as an alteration of the Mobile ad-hoc network (MA
-NET). Their main difference is that in VANET the communicating nodes are
vehicles and roadside units (RSU), thus they are characterized by constant
and rapid changes in topology as well as high mobility. The main motiva-
tion behind the implementation and adoption of vehicular communication
systems, is the augmentation of the road safety, the avoidance of collisions,
the reduction of delays and of the environmental pollution and the overall
improvement of the driving conditions.
To achieve that, uninterrupted communication and information exchange
between vehicles (V2V communication) or between vehicles and roadside
units (V2R communication) must be ensured. The communication, both be-
tween vehicles and between vehicles and infrastructure, is achieved making
use of the IEEE 802.11p, which is an amendment to the 802.11 standard that
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
05/06/2020 01:08:31 EEST - 137.108.70.13
6operates in the band of 5.9 GHz. It supports travelling speeds of up to 200
km/h, transmission range up to 1000 meters and data transfer rate up to 27
Mb/s (the default data transfer rate is 6 Mb/s).
2.3 RF Jamming
Radio Frequency (RF) jamming is the act of intentionally transmitting a sig-
nal that does not comply with legitimate physical and MAC layer protocols.
The primary goal of the jammer is to disrupt or alter the communication be-
tween the transmitter and the receiver. While interference is a common form
of RF jamming that can affect wireless communications - especially in an ur-
ban environment such as the one we examine - it can be distinguished from
actual jamming due to the fact that is is done unintentionally because of a
possible device malfunction.
2.4 Machine Learning
Machine Learning (ML) is a field of computer science, specifically a field of
Artificial Intelligence (AI), that enables computers to gain knowledge and
act without being explicitly programmed. This makes possible the creation
of systems that interact with the environment they operate in, learn from it
and improve in the way they perform a certain process.
Depending on whether or not there is a “learning signal” or “feedback”
available to the system, the machine learning can be divided into two general
catgories:
• Supervised Learning: the algorithm is trained using a number of known
inputs with their corresponding outputs (training) and its purpose is
to generalize the process for mapping inputs with unknown outputs
(testing).
• Unsupervised Learning: the algorithm is responsible for finding structure
in the input data, on its own, without any previous training.
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Chapter 3
System Model and Relative Speed
Estimation
3.1 System Model
3.1.1 Rician Fading Model
In our work, we explore the Rician fading model, that is a channel model
which includes path loss and also Rayleigh fading [29]. When a signal is
transmitted, whether it is a useful signal or a jamming one, this channel adds
fading in addition to thermal noise. The baseband signal at the receiver is:
y = (h1 +
1
d2s
)× xs × Ps + (h2 + 1d2j
)× xj × Pj + w (3.1)
In the above h1, h2 are complex Gaussian random variables capturing the
Rayleigh fading between transmitter - receiver (Tx − Rx) and jammer - re-
ceiver (Jx − Rx) respectively. The xs, xj are the symbols that are transmitted
(from the transmitter and the jammer), which in our case are equal to −1 or
+1 because we assume BPSK modulation. This modulation scheme is the
most robust in a high interference environment as it uses two phases which
are separated by 180◦. Ps and Pj are the transmission power per symbol of
the useful and of the jamming signal respectively and w is the channel noise.
The terms ds, dj correspond to the distance between the transmitter and the
receiver and between the jammer and the receiver.
3.1.2 Topology
The topology we adopt in our work (Fig. 3.1) involves a moving vehicle,
namely Rx, that serves as the target of the jammer, another vehicle or a RSU
(namely Tx) that is used as the transmitter of the useful signal and the jam-
ming vehicle that tries to intervene in the communication between Rx and Tx.
In our work we will assume V2V communication, thus the transmitter will
also be a vehicle. The Rx travels at a speed (uRx), that is bound to the lim-
itations of an urban environment, while communicating with the Tx. Upon
spotting its target, the jammer begins following it and starts jamming either
continuously or smartly (in order to stay undetected for as long as possible).
In smart jamming, the jammer only transmits when sensing energy above a
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FIGURE 3.1: Topology
certain threshold at the physical layer, while in constant jamming the signal
from the jammer is continuously transmitted.
3.2 Relative Speed Estimation
In the model of Fig. 3.1 we want, first, to estimate the speed of a moving
jamming source in the area. We assume that the transmitter sends known
pilot packets at the receiver to estimate the wireless channel (h1) between Tx
and Rx. The RF communication between Tx − Rx and Jx − Rx is exploited in
order to, first, estimate the combined channel between the transmitter and
the receiver and the channel between the jammer and the receiver (using
a MMSE estimator). Next the relative speed between the jammer and the
receiver is estimated using the RF Doppler shift. Subsequently, the variations
of the estimated relative speed are used as a new feature for our proposed
supervised machine learning approach for jamming attack detection.
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
05/06/2020 01:08:31 EEST - 137.108.70.13
9Chapter 4
Proposed Detection System
4.1 Initial VRS Algorithm
To make our detection method robust, apart from some of the metrics used
as features in related works (e.g. [19], [6]), we introduce and use an applica-
tion layer metric, namely the VRS metric, that exploits the estimated relative
speed from Section 3.2 and its variations. Our goal is to evaluate whether this
new metric improves the detection results under various scenarios without
adding extra complexity to our model.
Our method uses this new metric, as an extra feature, along with other,
cross-layer, metrics such as the Received Signal Strength and Interference
(RSSI), the Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio (SINR) and the Packet De-
livery Ratio (PDR), which are jointly processed by two classification algo-
rithms, namely the k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) [27] and the Random Forests
algorithm [14] respectively and one clustering algorithm, the K-means algo-
rithm [8].
To create the VRS metric that will be used in the supervised and in the
unsupervised learning process we, initially, made the following three funda-
mental assumptions:
• When the relative speed is equal to zero and remains unchanged, it
indicates the existence of a jammer that follows the victim-vehicle.
• When the relative speed is not equal to zero and remains unchanged, it
indicates the absence of a jammer as the relative speed is equal to the
speed of the vehicle.
• When the relative speed is not equal to zero for a period of time and
then becomes zero while remaining unchanged, it indicates the exis-
tence of a jammer that begins following the target after reaching it.
Based on these basic assumptions, we developed an algorithm, which
was first introduced in the unsupervised learning-based RF attack detection
approach, that depending on the variations of the relative speed, was able to
categorize the observations in one of the three scenarios introduced in sec-
tion 5.1.
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Algorithm 1 Relative Speed Variations Algorithm
1: M = number of observations
2: VRS = matrix(nrow = M, ncol = 1)
3: while (i < M) do
4: if ∆u[i] 6= 0 then
5: if ∆u[i] 6= ∆u[i-1] then
6: VRS← A
7: else if ∆u[i] == ∆u[i-1] then
8: VRS← NA
9: end if
10: else if ∆u[i] == 0 then
11: VRS← A
12: end if
13: end while
Algorithm 1 creates a new metric that is based on the variations of the
relative speed and is represented by the VRS array. Specifically, it consists
of two main if branches so that the potential presence of a jammer may be
identified by observing whether or not the relative speed is equal to zero,
while considering the fact that the speed of the participating vehicles remains
unchanged as the time progresses.
Having relative speed values that are constant and not equal to zero is a
clear indication of the absence of a jammer, following our initial assumption
of unchanged speed during the simulation. On the other hand, if the rela-
tive speed is zero then a jammer is present and follows its target. Based on
that observation, the algorithm iterates, initially, through all the values of the
relative speed - not equal to zero - from the ∆u array.
Each entry of the array is compared with the previous one. If a change is
observed, a value equal to A is assigned to the VRS array, thus indicating a
possible attack. If the relative speed remains unchanged then a value equal
to NA is assigned. The NA and A values are two extreme and distinct values
able to differentiate attack from no attack cases. Moving on to the second if
branch, the values of the ∆u array that are equal to zero indicate a jamming
attack, thus a value of A is, always, inserted into the VRS array.
4.2 Updated VRS Algorithm
In the previous section, the first and most basic form of the algorithm - used
so as to estimate the variations of the relative speed - was introduced. The
common characteristic of these assumptions is that the speed of the partici-
pating vehicles remains unchanged and is always greater than zero.
However, in a real-life scenario, such as the one that we study, the speed
- and consequently the relative speed - may not remain constant during the
observation. If we want to fully simulate an urban environment, we have
to consider the fact that the vehicles, at some point, may need to alter their
travelling speed or even completely stop. To handle these real-life situations,
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while still using the previously presented assupmtions as a basis, we imple-
mented the Updated Variations of Relative Speed Algorithm (Algorithm 2)
with the assumption that the jammer adopts the same driving behavior as its
target (i.e when the target decelerates the jammer also decelerates).
Algorithm 2 Updated VRS Algorithm
1: M = number of observations
2: vrs = matrix(nrow = M, ncol = 1)
3: k = 1
4: if ∆u[k] == ∆u[k+1] then
5: vrs← NA
6: trigger = 0
7: else if ∆u[k] 6= ∆u[k+1] then
8: vrs← A
9: trigger = 1
10: end if
11:
12: k ++
13: while (k < M) do
14: if ∆u[k] 6= 0 then
15: if ∆u[k] 6= ∆u[k-1] then
16: if ∆u[k] == u[k] then
17: vrs← NA
18: trigger = 0
19: else if ∆u[k] 6= u[k] then
20: vrs← A
21: trigger = 1
22: end if
23: else if ∆u[k]==∆u[k-1] then
24: if ∆u[k] 6= u[k] then
25: vrs← A
26: trigger = 1
27: else if ∆u[k] == u[k] then
28: if hasNext == T then
29: if (∆u[k-1]==u[k-1]&& ∆u[k+1]==u[k+1]) then
30: vrs← NA
31: trigger = 0
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Algorithm 2 Updated VRS Algorithm (continued)
32: else
33: vrs← A
34: trigger = 1
35: end if
36: else if hasNext == F then
37: if trigger == 0 then
38: vrs← NA
39: trigger = 0
40: else
41: vrs← A
42: trigger = 1
43: end if
44: end if
45: end if
46: end if
47: else if ∆u[k] == 0 then
48: if u[k] 6= 0 then
49: vrs← A
50: trigger = 1
51: else if u[k] == 0 then
52: if ∆u[k-1] == u[k-1] then
53: if trigger == 0 then
54: vrs← NA
55: trigger = 0
56: else
57: vrs← A
58: trigger = 1
59: end if
60: else if ∆u[k-1] 6= u[k-1] then
61: vrs← A
62: trigger = 1
63: end if
64: end if
65: end if
66: end while
67: return vrs
The VRS Algorithm detects changes in the relative speed of the provided
observations. To ensure that, the relative speed and the speed from the pre-
vious as well as the subsequent observations are used along with a series of
control flow statements. The algorithm is divided into two main parts, with
the first examining the case in which the relative speed value is not equal
to zero and the second examining the opposite case, each one with its own
logical checks to determine the existence of a threat or not.
Apart from the estimated relative speed, in order to handle cases of speed
alterations, the speed of the receiver has to be examined as well. If ∆u is not
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
05/06/2020 01:08:31 EEST - 137.108.70.13
Chapter 4. Proposed Detection System 13
equal to zero, then either there is no jammer present (and only interference
may potentially affect the wireless communication) or there is a jammer that
has not yet reached the receiver. To identify in which case we are into, we
have to examine whether or not there has been a variation in the relative
speed compared to a previous time instance.
Observing a variation in the relative speed, however, is not, by iteself, a
clear indicator of the presence or absence of a jammer. For that reason the
speed of the receiver u is, also, exploited. The equality between the relative
speed (∆u) and the speed (u), while ∆u changes, indicates the absence of a
jammer, as the speed of the jammer uJx is equal to zero and the speed of the
receiver uRx is in fact the relative speed. On the contrary, a difference between
∆u and u indicates the presence of a jammer that follows the receiver.
On the other hand, if no alteration of the relative speed is observed while
the relative speed value is not equal to the speed value, a possible presence of
a jammer is registered. This could occur in a situation where the target vehi-
cle would reduce its speed due to an obstacle. Following our assumption, the
jammer would, also, decrease its travelling speed, thus keeping the relative
speed unchanged but also different from the travelling speed of the receiver.
Counter to the previous, if no alteration in the relative speed value is ob-
served (for the previous and the next measurement) while having ∆u == u,
we conclude to that a jammer is not following the receiver.
Having examined the case where the observed relative speed value is not
equal to zero, we proceed to the opposite case. With ∆u == 0, the initial
form of the algorithm (Algorithm 1), would have indicated the existance of a
jammer that has reached its target and that follows it closely with the same
speed. Examining a real-life environment, however, is more complicated. If
the travelling speed u of the receiver is not equal to zero, while ∆u == 0, a
jammer has reached the receiver and follows it while disrupting the commu-
nications. On the hand, if the travelling speed is zero (while ∆u == 0) there
might be a jammer present that has stopped moving (following the behavior
of the target). In that case, we have to examine the previous observation for
equality between relative speed and travelling speed as well as the trigger
value to determine the outcome.
The ∆u and u variables represent an array of estimated relative speed val-
ues and travelling speed values respectively, M is the number of the available
observations upon which the algorithm operates, vrs is an array used to store
the estimation result (A for attack or NA for not attack) of the current obser-
vation and the trigger is a binary variable which indicates the presence of a
jammer (value is equal to 1) or its absence (value is equal to 0).
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4.3 Comparison of the VRS Algorithm Versions
The difference between the two versions of the proposed algorithm, for cre-
ating our novel metric, is evident and concerns the handling or not of the
speed variations that might occur in an real-life, urban environment like the
one we examine. Therefore, our detection scheme depends on the updated
version of the VRS Algorithm (Algorithm 2).
Before proceeding to a following chapter, a comparison could be made
using the two versions of the VRS Algorithm in unsupervised learning (clus-
tering), utilizing the K-means algorithm and using a number of two clus-
ters. Using a number of k = 2 clusters, will indicate the existance or not of
a jammer (in other words, it will differenctiate the Interference Scenario from the
other two jamming attack scenarios described in section 5.1) in a real-life situation
where speed variations are possible.
4.3.1 Updated VRS Algorithm Clustering Results
From Table 4.3.1 the crusial role of the updated VRS Algorithm in handling
speed variations during the simulations is evident. More specifically, from
each of the three scenarios we obtain 1000 measurements and we try to cat-
egorize them under two major classes, the Attack and the Interference class
respectively. 1
Scenario Interference
Scenario
Smart Attack
Scenario
Constant At-
tack Scenario
Attack 1 1000 1000
Interference 999 0 0
TABLE 4.1: Clustering results for the updated VRS Algorithm
By the manner in which the scenarios are created in 5.1, we, ideally, expect
the observations of the two jamming scenarios, that is 2000 observations in
total, to be categorized in the “Attack” class, while the remaining 1000 obser-
vations from the interference scenario to be categorized in the “Interference”
class. The updated VRS Algorithm produces a clustering result close to the
ideal one, with only one interference observation being wrongfully catego-
rized as an attack observation (Fig. 4.1).
4.3.2 Initial VRS Algorithm Clustering Results
Without the utilization of the updated VRS Algorithm, however, the cluster-
ing results obtained when attempting to examine the same observed values
from the three scenarios, are highly confused. Due to the fact that the initial
VRS Algorithm was designed to operate under optimal circumstances, many
of the observations are wrongly classified, thus an unreliable scheme, when
dealing with real-life circumstances, is created (Fig. 4.2).
1Although the term “categorize” is not utterly correct when considering a clustering
problem, we will use it so as to present the group in which the observations are predicted to
belong to.
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
05/06/2020 01:08:31 EEST - 137.108.70.13
Chapter 4. Proposed Detection System 15
Scenario Interference
Scenario
Smart Attack
Scenario
Constant At-
tack Scenario
Attack 690 679 894
Interference 310 321 106
TABLE 4.2: Clustering results for the initial VRS Algorithm
FIGURE 4.1: Clustering results for the updated VRS Algorithm
FIGURE 4.2: Clustering results for the initial VRS Algorithm
4.4 Detection System Assumptions
As it is already stated, the machine learning methods that are used are the
KNN, the Random Forests and the K-means algorithms respectively. Their
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TABLE 4.3: Simulation Parameters
Evaluation Parameters in Veins Simulator Values
uTx,Rx,Jx 15m/sec.
dTx,Rx 35m
dinitial 200m
PTx,Jx 100mW
Minimum sensitivity (Pth) -86dBm
Transmission Range 130-300 meters
choice does not affect the efficiency of our algorithm as our proposed fea-
ture is not constrained by the type of the supervised or usupervised learning
algorithm that is used.
Both supervised learning techniques are very popular, with the KNN be-
ing robust against noisy training data like the ones obtained from a real-life
urban environment and the Random Forests being one of the most accurate
algorithms due to the fact that reduces the possibility of overfitting signif-
icantly (by averaging several trees, there is a significantly lower chance of
overfitting). As far as the unsupervised learning is concerned, the K-means
algorithm is one of the fastest and simplest clustering algorithms, while, at
the same time, providing easy to interpret clustering results.
Regarding the details of our simulation setup, the speed of all the vehicles
involved (uTx,Rx,Jx), the initial distance between the jammer and the pair of Rx -
Tx (dinitial), the distance that seperates the receiver from the transmitter through-
out the course of the simulation (dTx,Rx) as well as the power of all the the
transmitted signals (PTx,Jx), are presented in Table 4.3.
The power of all the transmitted signals is measured in milliwatts (mW)
and is converted in the dBm scale prior to using it in the algorithm. The
signal that is transmitted from both the jammer and the transmitter consists
of streams that are 500 bits long. For each one of the three scenarios, a number
of 1000 packets is transmitted. Using a time sample of 0.1 sec, we simulate
the system for 100 seconds (for each scenario) and obtain 1000 measurements
(for each scenario).
For the simulation of the movement of the vehicles and their wireless
communication we used the Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) and the
OMNET++/Veins [26] simulators respectively. SUMO is utilized as our traf-
fic simulator making use of a part of the Erlangen city map while OMNET++
is used to simulate the wireless communication. The evaluation parameters
in the Veins simulator are also presented in Table 4.3.
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Chapter 5
Simulation Setup
5.1 Jamming Scenarios
In our work, we created three different scenarios - namely Interference Sce-
nario, Smart Attack Scenario and Constant Attack Scenario - each repre-
senting a jamming attack case that could, potentially, affect a VANET in real
life.
In the Interference Scenario, we assume that a jammer is not present in the
network so as to evaluate the efficiency of our method in differentiating jam-
ming from interference. The vehicle travels, when, at some point, passes
through an area with significant RF interference by which its communication
with the other vehicles or with the RSU is affected.
In the Smart Attack Scenario, the performance of a more intelligent jam-
mer [13] is evaluated. Specifically a smart jammer starts following the victim-
vehicle while transmitting a jamming signal. When the jammer reaches its
target at distance of about 10m, retreats to a safe position and transmits in a
reactive way. The jammer is designed to start transmitting upon sensing en-
ergy above a certain threshold. The threshold is set to be equal to−86dBm, as
it is empirically determined to be a good tradeoff between jammer sensitiv-
ity and false transmission detection rate. If the detected energy exceeds the
threshold during a certain time span of Tdetection = 12µs (during which the
jammer observes the energy levels of the channel), an ongoing 802.11p trans-
mission is assumed by the jammer, thus starting its jamming signal transmis-
sion for a duration of Tduration = 84µs.
In the Constant Attack Scenario, we study the case of a constant jammer
that follows the victim-vehicle while transmitting at a minimum power (we
chose its initial transmission power to be equal to the 13 of its total power).
When the jammer reaches its target, begins transmitting constantly with its
full power without any intention to stay undetected.
Fig. 5.1 - 5.3, illustrate the behavior of the jammer by presenting the the
plots of SINR versus Time for every one of the three scenarios.
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FIGURE 5.1: SINR vs Time for the Rician Fading Model in the
Interference Scenario
FIGURE 5.2: SINR vs Time for the Rician Fading Model in the
Smart Attack Scenario
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FIGURE 5.3: SINR vs Time for the Rician Fading Model in the
Constant Attack Scenario
5.2 Supervised Learning Testing Cases
The previously described scenarios represent possible real-life RF jamming
attacks that could affect the V2V or the V2R communication in an urban en-
vironment and they are used in both the clustering and the classification pro-
cess. Beyond that and due to the fact that the classification process is also
affected by the training and testing datasets, a series of “Supervised Learn-
ing Testing Cases” has been created. These cases allow us to explore deeper
the proposed system depending on the on the set of observations that is uti-
lized for training and testing.
These cases only affect how the training and testing is performed, without
any further implications in how the scenarios function. They are created in
such a way so as to provide us with a comparison between the use or not of
the VRS metric in the classification process under various circumstances in
all the three scenarios previously presented, that would, in turn, highlight its
significance.
• Train and test with data from the same speed value with the VRS metric
(Same_KNN-VRS and Same_RF-VRS case): the prediction model is
trained and tested using observations collected under the speed of 15
m/s, with the use of the VRS metric. To avoid testing with "previously
seen data", thus leading to biased classification results, a series of safety
measures have been taken to ensure that the training and testing sets
are completely separated .
• Train and test with data from the same speed value without the VRS metric
(Same_KNN and Same_RF case): similar to the previous case, with the
only difference being the omission of the VRS metric in the classification
process.
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• Train and test under different speed values with the VRS metric (Different_KNN-
VRS and Different_RF-VRS case): the previously trained prediction
model is tested using data that was collected under a speed of 25 m/s,
that is under a speed different from the one the training of the predic-
tion model was based on.
• Train and test with data from different speed values without the VRS metric
(Different_KNN and Different_RF case): similar to the previous case
but without the utilization of the VRS metric as an extra feature in the
classification process.
• Train and test with normalized data from the same speed value with the VRS
metric (Norm_KNN-VRS and Norm_RF-VRS case): the data is normal-
ized prior to its use training and in testing. By normalization, we refer
to the process of changing the data so as to belong in the 0 - 1 range.
Both training and testing are conducted on data collected under a speed
of 15 m/s but without common observations in the two sets (as stated
before).
• Train and test with normalized data from the same speed value without the
VRS metric (Norm_KNN and Norm_RF case): similar to the previous
case but without the VRS metric.
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Chapter 6
Simulation Results
6.1 Simulation Software
Prior to presenting the unsupervised and supervised learning simulation re-
sults, we have to refer to the tools used to perform the classification and the
clustering. As it is already stated, the OMNET++/VEINS simulator is used
in order to simulate a real-life communication environment from which we
can obtain our measurements. To setup and test our clustering and classifica-
tion based RF jamming attack detection systems on the previously obtained
data, we chose to use the programming language R [31].
Although, it is usually used for statistical computing, it provides all the
tools (pre-defined algorithms, documentation, graphical representation) re-
quired to efficiently use a wide range of machine learning algorithms, thus
making it ideal for our purposes. The environment we used is R-Studio [28],
an open source, integrated development environment (IDE) for R.
6.2 Unsupervised Learning Simulation Results
Our first approach, regarding the detection of a possible jamming attack af-
fecting the V2V communication, is based on the unsupervised learning algo-
rithm of K-means. It, particularly, utilizes a number of k = 2 clusters so as to
differentiate an intentional (attack) from an unintentional (interference) jam-
ming scenario, which might be very important for determining the behavior
that will be adopted, especially in an urban environment. To prove the im-
portance of the VRS metric in the RF jamming attack detection process, we
execute our simulations with and without the use of the new metric and we
compare the obtained results.
As it is already stated, each simulation lasts 300 seconds and is equally
split in the three attack scenarios discussed in Section 5.1, so that the first 100
sec represent the Smart Attack scenario, the next 100 sec the Interference sce-
nario and the last 100 sec the Constant Attack scenario. The color of the clusters
is randomly picked by the visualization tool. A total number of 3000 obser-
vations (1000 observations from each scenario), obtained under the speed of
15m/sec (≈ 54km/h) and 25m/s (≈ 90km/h) respectively, is utilized.
First we begin by examining the observations from the 15 m/sec speed
range while using and omitting the proposed VRS metric in the clustering
process.
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Scenario Interference
Scenario
Smart Attack
Scenario
Constant
Attack
Scenario
Attack 1 1000 1000
Interference 999 0 0
TABLE 6.1: Clustering results for 15m/s using the VRS metric
Scenario Interference
Scenario
Smart Attack
Scenario
Constant
Attack
Scenario
Attack 726 808 672
Interference 274 192 328
TABLE 6.2: Clustering results for 15m/s omitting the VRS met-
ric
The difference between the use and no use of the VRS metric in the clus-
tering process is evident. From Table 6.1 we can see that only one observation
is misclassified as intentional jamming while it is actually an observation of
the Interference scenario. Both for the Smart Attack scenario and the Constant
Attack scenario there are no misclassifications. On the other hand, when we
try to differentiate intentional from unintentional jamming while choosing
not to use the VRS metric, the “clustering accuracy” 1 drops greatly.
Observing Table 6.2, it is obvious that there is great confusion in distin-
guishing a jamming attack from interference. From the 1000 observations
that actually belong in the Interference scenario, only 274 are categorized cor-
rectly. The same confusion is, also, observed in the two attack scenarios
where there are 192 and 328 wrong categorizations. This could be an im-
portant safety issue in an urban environment - especially when a jamming
attack is misinterpreted 2.
The following figures visuallize the previously described clustering re-
sults for the case of a travelling speed equal to 15 m/sec (Fig. 6.1, 6.2). The
color of the figures indicates the group in which each observation is clustered
to. The Smart Attack Scenario and the Constant Attack Scenario are represented
by the black while the Interference Scenario by the red color. The appearance
of more than one colors in each scenario, that is in each 100 seconds (as de-
scribed in 4.4), indicates the existance of misclassifications:
1In fact there is no such term to describe a clustering outcome, but we can use it in our
case as it is a priori known that the most accurate clustering result would be close to the one
presented previously in Table 6.1.
2In that case a behavior not suitable for defending against a malicious RF jamming attack
could be wrongly adopted, thus leading to compromisation of safety.
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FIGURE 6.1: Clustering results for speed = 15 m/sec with the
use of the VRS metric
FIGURE 6.2: Clustering results for speed = 15 m/sec without
the use of the VRS metric
Having examined the case of medium speed values, we now proceed to
a higher speed range that would be much rarer in an urban environment.
Nonetheless, it is important to test the performance of the overall system
even in this situation. The succeeding tables contain the clustering results
from the use and omission of the VRS metric in the clustering process while
using observations obtained under a speed of 25 m/sec.
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Scenario Interference
Scenario
Smart Attack
Scenario
Constant
Attack
Scenario
Attack 0 1000 1000
Interference 1000 0 0
TABLE 6.3: Clustering results for 25m/s using the VRS metric
Scenario Interference
Scenario
Smart Attack
Scenario
Constant
Attack
Scenario
Attack 719 885 698
Interference 281 115 302
TABLE 6.4: Clustering results for 25m/s omitting the VRS met-
ric
Examining the precedenting tables of results, the importance of the VRS
metric in the clustering process is highlighted once more. With the utiliza-
tion of our proposed metric as an extra feature in the K-means algorithm, we
have a perfect differentiation among cases of intentional and unintentional
jamming. However, the omission of the feature leads to clustering results
similar to the ones presented in Table 6.2, where there is great confusion be-
tween the different cases.
This can be visualized in the following figures for the case of a travelling
speed equal to 25 m/sec (Fig. 6.3, 6.4):
FIGURE 6.3: Clustering results for speed = 25 m/sec with the
use of the VRS metric
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FIGURE 6.4: Clustering results for speed = 25 m/sec without
the use of the VRS metric
6.3 Supervised Learning Simulation Results
6.3.1 Simulation Structure: Training and Testing Datasets
We now proceed to our second approach that leverages the use of super-
vised learning techniques, particularly the KNN and the Random Forests al-
gorithms respectively. To highlight the significance of our proposed system
in the classification process, we proceed to comparing the cases presented
previously in section 5.2.
In particular, for each case we execute, once more, a simulation which
lasts 300 seconds and is equally split in the three jamming scenarios dis-
cussed in Section 5.1, so that the first 100 sec represent the Smart Attack
Scenario, the next 100 sec the Interference Scenario and the last 100 sec the
Constant Attack Scenario. Prior to presenting the classification results, we
have to define the size of the training and testing sets as well as the total
number of observations used, so as to make them more interpretable.
Each simulation, that is each case from 5.2, uses a set of 3000 observations,
equally split into the three attack scenarios examined. To avoid overfitting 3,
only 30% of the total number of the observations is used for training while
the remaining 70% for testing.
Based on the ratio above, in our simulations, the number of the obser-
vations in the training set is 941 whereas the number of the observations in
the testing set is 2059 (randomly chosen but almost equally split among the
three scenarios in both cases). The following table (Table 6.5) summarizes the
number of observations from each scenario, used for training and for testing.
3Overfitting occurs when the classifier tends to memorize the training set and thus gen-
eralize poorly when facing previously unseen data.
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
05/06/2020 01:08:31 EEST - 137.108.70.13
Chapter 6. Simulation Results 26
Operation Interference
Scenario
Smart
Attack
Scenario
Constant
Attack
Scenario
Total Ob-
servations
Testing 703 685 671 2059
Training 293 319 329 941
TABLE 6.5: Number of observations in training and testing
datasets
The training process is performed once 4 while the testing takes place ei-
ther each time a new measurement is obtained or, to avoid high computation
cost, at a fixed time instance for a group of previously unseen measurements.
This allows our detection system to operate almost in real-time, thus ensur-
ing the identification of an attack and the on-time reaction.
6.3.2 Classification Model Evaluation Measures
The classification results will be presented leveraging the use of a table lay-
out, known as the confusion matrix, whose purpose is to visualize the perfor-
mance of a classification algorithm. Each row of the matrix represents the
instances belonging to a predicted class while each column represents the
instances in an actual class.
If we have two classes in which we want to classify a number of observa-
tions, then the confusion matrix is a 2x2 table, similar to the precedenting:
Predicted
Values
Actual Values
Class 1 Class 2
Class 1
True
Positive
False
Negative
Class 2 FalsePositive
True
Negative
TABLE 6.6: Confusion matrix for two classes
Supposing that the positive class is Class 1 and the negative class is Class
2 we conclude that the True Positive values are the observations that were
predicted as positive and were actually positive. Similarly, the True Negative
values are those predicted as negative and are actually negative. On the other
hand, the False Positive and False Negative values are those predicted as neg-
ative/positive and when they are actually positive/negative. Having more than
three classes like in our situation, increases the dimensions of the confusion
4In a real-life environment it could be conducted at an initialization phase prior to trav-
elling and if new data were available, otherwise it could be skipped as the training of the
predictor would have already been up-to-date.
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matrix proportionally. Therefore, in our case, we make use of a 3x3 confusion
matrix with each one of the three classes representing a scenario.
Apart from the mere visualization of the results obtained, the confusion
matrix also creates a series of measures that are used in order to determine
the performance of the classification model and clarify the obtained results,
thus a description of these measures, at this stage, would be important:
• Accuracy is the overall accuracy of the classifier, that is all the correctly
predicted labels over all the predictions.
• Sensitivity or True Positive Rate is the proportion of measurements that
were predicted to be positive and are positive, from all the measure-
ments that actually are positive (where positive can mean either jam-
ming attack or interference).
• Specificity or True Negative Rate is the proportion of measurements that
were predicted to be negative and are negative, from all the measure-
ments that actually are negative (where negative can mean either jam-
ming attack or interference).
• Fall-out or False Positive Rate is equal to 1− TNR.
• Miss Rate or False Negative Rate is equal to 1− TPR.
Based on the previous definitions, someone could intuitively decide that
the measure of accuracy alone would suffice in order to determine the perfor-
mance of the classification model. In most cases this is true, as it can also be
seen from related works like [19] and [6]. However, if the number of obser-
vations in different classes varies greatly, then accuracy will not be a reliable
metric for the real performance of a classifier, as it will be affected by the class
with the larger number of observations and thus a careful inspection of the
results is required.
In our case, the number of elements from each scenario that is used in
the training and the testing process, is carefully chosen so as to avoid the
large data variations described previously. As a result, accuracy alone can
be a reliable measure of the classifier performance. However, we will try to
explain and justify the calculated accuracy value using the other measures
(especially by using the Sensitivity) as well, so as to describe our findings in
the clearest way possible.
6.3.3 Rician Fading Model Classification Results
The classification results obtained while simulating the supervised learning
testing cases, described in Section 5.2, are presented, in a comparative man-
ner. As it is already stated, these cases are based on the three scenarios from
section 5.1 and are created so as to form a comparison between the results
obtained from the use and the omission of the VRS metric, respectively, in
the classification process.
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Comparison of the Same_KNN/RF-VRS and Same_KNN/
RF cases
The classification results for both supervised learning algorithms while using
the VRS metric in the classification process, are presented in the following
confusion matrices:
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 703 0 0
Smart Attack 0 494 174
Constant
Attack
0 191 497
TABLE 6.7: Confusion matrix for the Same_KNN-VRS case
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 703 1 1
Smart Attack 0 442 167
Constant
Attack
0 242 503
TABLE 6.8: Confusion matrix for the Same_RF-VRS case
Examining each classification model individually and starting from the
one based on the KNN algorithm while using the VRS metric, the calculated
accuracy of the prediction model is equal to 82.27%. Moreover, the True-
Positive (sensitivity) rate for the Interference Scenario is 100%, for the Smart
Attack Scenario 72.12% and for the Constant Attack Scenario 74.07%.
The fairly high true-positive rate (TPR), considering that the data used
are close to real-life measurements, thus being affected by the noise of the
channel, the travelling speed of the vehicles and the jamming signal that be-
comes more intense as the jammer approaches it target, yields that fewer
intentional jamming attack cases will be undetected or confused with unin-
tentional jamming cases. Apart from that, it can be observed that using the
VRS metric in the classification process, leads to limiting the misclassifica-
tions among the two intentional jamming attack scenarios with no confusion
between jamming attacks and interference. The TPR of each class also jus-
tifies the prediction accuracy of the KNN based classification model, which
remains unbiased towards the available classes.
Moving on to the classification model of the Random Forests algorithm,
the results do not seem to differ significantly. The accuracy of the current
classification model is equal to 80.04% and slightly decreases compared to
the previous, KNN, case. The TPR of the classes justifies this decrease as
for the Interference Scenario is equal to 100%, for the Smart Attack Scenario
equal to 64.53% and for the Constant Attack Scenario equal to 74.96%.
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With the omission of the VRS metric from the classification process, the
results obtained differ significantly from the previous ones, not just in accu-
racy but also in terms of RF jamming attack and interference differentiation
ability.
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 682 38 33
Smart Attack 17 470 160
Constant
Attack
4 177 478
TABLE 6.9: Confusion matrix for the Same_KNN case
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 652 29 23
Smart Attack 23 434 158
Constant
Attack
28 222 490
TABLE 6.10: Confusion matrix for the Same_RF case
The accuracy achieved by the KNN-based classification model is equal to
79.16%. This might not seem to be a great decrease compared to the KNN-
based classification model where the VRS metric was utilized, but observing
the results proves the opposite. To understand that, we have to examine
the TPR for each class. For the Interference Scenario it is 97.01%, for the
Smart Attack Scenario 68.61% and for the Constant Attack Scenario 71.24%.
It can be seen that the ability of the classifier to correctly identify cases of
intentional or unintentional jamming (TP observations) is affected by the use
or omission of the VRS metric. In addition to that, the omission of the VRS
metric is highly correlated with the inability to differentiate a jamming attack
from interference.
Similar observations can be made based on the outcome of the RF-based
classification model, in which case, the accuracy achieved is equal to 76.54%.
Examining each class (that is each scenario, as it is already stated) individu-
ally, we can see that the TPR for the Interference Scenario is equal to 92.75%,
for the Smart Attack Scenario 63.36% and for the Constant Attack Scenario
73.03% respectively. Once more, the exclusion of the VRS metric from the
classification process reduces the propability of a correct jamming attack or
interference detection, while causing significant confusion among the obser-
vations of the different classes (increase of misclassification rate).
The classification results presented above for both cases, can be visualized
in the following figures, where the observations of the different classes are
highlighted. As described previously in section 6.3.1, each figure represents
a simulation that involves all three scenarios (starting with the Smart Attack
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Scenario, moving on to the Interference Scenario and concluding with the Constant
Attack Scenario) and lasts 300 seconds.
Similar to the unsupervised learning approach, the color of the figures
indicates the class in which each observation is predicted to belong to. The
Smart Attack Scenario is represented by the red, the Interference Scenario by the
black and the Constant Attack Scenario by the green color. The appearance of more
than one colors in each scenario, that is in each 100 seconds (as described
in 4.4), indicates the existance of misclassifications.
FIGURE 6.5: SINR vs Time for comparing the Same_KNN-VRS
and Same_KNN cases
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FIGURE 6.6: SINR vs Time for comparing the Same_RF-VRS and
Same_RF case
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Comparison of the Different_KNN/RF-VRS and Different_KNN/RF cases
As stated previously, these cases examine the situation in which the training
and the testing are based on observations that were collected under differ-
ent speed. More specifically, the training of the classifiers (both for the KNN
and for the Random Forests algorithm) is conducted based on measurements
collected under a speed of 15m/s. On the other hand, for the testing, mea-
surements collected under a higher speed of 25m/s are used. These cases
aim at simulating real-life situations in which we might not be able to train
and test our classification model on the exact same speed.
We begin the presentation and comparison of the two cases by presenting
the classification results obtained while the VRS metric was utilized in both
the KNN and the Random Forests algorithms as an extra feature.
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 663 0 0
Smart Attack 0 458 437
Constant
Attack
0 243 258
TABLE 6.11: Confusion matrix for in the Different_KNN-VRS
case
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 663 0 1
Smart Attack 0 411 330
Constant
Attack
0 290 364
TABLE 6.12: Confusion matrix for the Different_RF-VRS case
Examining each classification model individually, we observe that for the
KNN-based model the accuracy achieved is equal to 66.97%. In addition,
the TPR for the Interference Scenario is equal to 100%, for the Smart Attack
Scenario 65.34% and for the Constant Attack Scenario 37.12%. Compared
to the repsective results from Table 6.9, where the training and testing mea-
surements were collected under the same speed, a significant decrease can be
observed.
This decrease, however, is expected as we choose to test the classifica-
tion model using data with little similarities compared to the data used for
training. Nevertheless, with the use of the VRS metric a clear differentiation
between cases of intentional and cases of unintentional jamming is achieved,
as well as restriction of the misclassifications between the two, attack scenar-
ios only.
Moving on to the Random Forests-based classification model, we obtain
similar results. The accuracy of the classifier is equal to 69.84%, which can
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be explained due to the better detection ability in terms of the Constant Sce-
nario. To elaborate, the calculated TPR for the Constant Attack Scenario is
equal to 52.37%, while in the KNN-based classifier the respective percentage
was only 37.12%. That, in addition to the similar TPR for the Interference
and the Smart Attack Scenario (100% and 58.63% respectively) between the
two classification models, leads to the increase of the overall accuracy of the
classifier.
With the omission of the VRS metric from the classification process, the
results obtained differ significantly from the previous ones, not just in accu-
racy, which is reduced even more, but also in terms of intentional jamming
attack and interference differentiation ability.
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 601 38 380
Smart Attack 11 426 189
Constant
Attack
51 237 126
TABLE 6.13: Confusion matrix for the Different_KNN case
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 602 60 212
Smart Attack 13 408 353
Constant
Attack
48 233 130
TABLE 6.14: Confusion matrix for the Different_RF case
From the confusion matrices presented above, it is evident that the omis-
sion of the VRS metric while training and testing using measurements col-
lected under different speed, leads to the worst possible classification out-
come. Starting from the KNN-based classifier, the accuracy achieved is equal
to 56%, with the TPR for the three classes being 90.65%, 60.77% and 18.13%
respectively. The low TPR indicates limited ability in detecting the correct
class for each observation. Moreover, it is obvious that there is high confu-
sion between cases of intentional and unintentional jamming, thus making
this classifier inadequate for a real-life environment. The same can be stated
for the Random Forests-based classification model. The accuracy achieved is
equal to 55.37%, with the TPR for the three classes being 90.8%, 58.2% and
18.71% respectively. Once more, not using the VRS metric renders the classi-
fication model unable to handle real-life situations.
The results from both cases presented in the respective confusion matri-
ces, can be visualized, with the observations from the different classes being
highlighted.
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FIGURE 6.7: SINR vs Time for comparing the Different_KNN-
VRS and Different_KNN cases
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FIGURE 6.8: SINR vs Time for comparing the Different_RF-VRS
and Different_RF case
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Comparison of the Norm_KNN/RF-VRS and Norm_KNN/
RF cases
With these last two cases we aim at determining whether or not the nor-
malization of the data prior to their use in training and in testing affects the
classification results, with and without the use of the VRS metric.
Starting from the case in which the VRS metric is utilized as an extra fea-
ture in the classification process, the accuracy of the KNN-based prediction
model is calculated to be equal to 81.25%. Moreover, examining each class in-
dividually we have a TPR equal to 100% for the Interference Scenario, 70.51%
for the Smart Attack Scenario and 72.58% for the Constant Attack Scenario.
The fairly high TPR for all the classes, indicates an overall good intentional
and unintentional jamming differentiation ability, with the misclassifications
being limited among the two attack scenarios.
Regarding the Random Forest-based classification model, the accuracy
achieved is equal to 80.09%, with the TPR for the three classes being 100% (In-
terference Scenario), 64.67% (Smart Attack Scenario) and 74.96% (Constant
Attack Scenario) respectively. Once more, leveraging the use of the VRS met-
ric enhances the ability of the predictor to detect jamming attack cases and
distinguish them from cases of interference.
Apart from that, inspecting the classification results of the respective mod-
els (Same_KNN-VRS and Same_RF-VRS cases) where there is no normaliza-
tion of the measurements prior to their utilization, we can conclude to that no
great difference is observed, neither in terms of accuracy or in terms of sensi-
tivity (TPR). Therefore, we determine that the normalization of the measure-
ments is not required for the efficient operation of the classification models.
The results for both classification models are presented in the following
confusion matrices:
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 703 0 0
Smart Attack 0 483 184
Constant
Attack
0 202 487
TABLE 6.15: Confusion matrix for the Norm_KNN-VRS case
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 703 1 1
Smart Attack 0 443 167
Constant
Attack
0 241 503
TABLE 6.16: Confusion matrix for the Norm_RF-VRS case
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As it is evident from all the previous supervised learning testing cases,
the exclusion of the VRS metric leads to an overall deterioration of the clas-
sification outcome - both in terms of accuracy and in terms of successful and
efficient detection and differentiation ability.
Starting from the KNN-based predictor, the accuracy achieved is equal to
78.1%. Compared to the previous case where the VRS metric was utilized,
we observe that the drop is not so significant. The same is true for the TPR
values of the three classes. The calculated TPR for the Interference Scenario
is 95.87%, for the Smart Attack Scenario 67.3% and for the Constant Attack
Scenario 70.49%.
Where the difference lays, however, is in the misclassifications. In the cur-
rent case there are several misclassifications that confuse, once again, cases of
intentional jamming with cases of interference, while, on the contrary, with
the use of the VRS metric these errors were confined among the two attack
scenarios. This can also be seen from the results of the Random Forests-based
predictor, whose accuracy is equal to 76.4%. The following confusion matri-
ces present the results for the two classification models:
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 674 42 34
Smart Attack 29 461 164
Constant
Attack
0 182 473
TABLE 6.17: Confusion matrix for the Norm_KNN case
Scenario Interference Smart Attack Constant
Attack
Interference 651 28 21
Smart Attack 27 436 164
Constant
Attack
25 221 486
TABLE 6.18: Confusion matrix for the Norm_RF case
The visualization of the results is conducted as previously and presented
in the following figures:
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FIGURE 6.9: SINR vs Time for comparing the Norm_KNN-VRS
and Norm_KNN cases
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FIGURE 6.10: SINR vs Time for comparing the Norm_RF-VRS
and Norm_RF case
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6.3.4 Classification Accuracy Synopsis
Fig. 6.11 summarizes the accuracy achieved by both the KNN and the Ran-
dom Forests algorithm when based only on the features previously used in
the literature for jamming attack detection [19], compared to the proposed
approaches KNN-VRS and RF-VRS that use the VRS metric. The VRS metric
increases the accuracy of the classifier and ensures almost perfect differenti-
ation between cases of intentional and unintentional jamming. When using
the VRS metric while training and testing with data from the same speed,
there is an increase up to about 4% in the classification accuracy. On the
other hand, when testing with data from a different speed compared to the
one the training was based on, the increase in the classification accuracy is
even greater, reaching up to about 14%.
FIGURE 6.11: Achieved accuracy of the classification model
when using or omitting the VRS metric
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this work, we presented a scheme for detecting a specific type of DoS
attack, namely RF jamming attack, that is based on cross-layer supervised
and unsupervised machine learning and that exploits a novel metric from
the application layer, the variations of the relative speed between the jammer
and the target vehicles. The relative speed is passively estimated from the
combined value of the desired and the jamming signal at the target vehicle.
To evaluate the significance of the proposed feature, we implemented three
different scenarios - two with a jammer present and one with interference
only.
With our work, we introduced a proactive approach against potential RF
jamming attacks which is able to differentiate benign from malicious jam-
ming, that is interference from jamming, distinguish the unique character-
istics of each attack, if there are more than one types of jammer affecting
communication and predict a threat, thus minimizing the security risks for
two or more connected vehicles.
We also showed that typical wireless receiver measurements from the net-
work and the physical layer like PDR, SINR, RSS might be able to detect an
attack but are less efficient in distinguishing interference from intentional
jamming, which is very important in an urban environment. Through our
evaluation, using the proposed classification algorithms - namely KNN-VRS
and RF-VRS respectively - we were able to point out the vital role of the rela-
tive speed and its variations from the application layer in jamming detection
and unintentional jamming cases differentiation, as well as in the overall in-
crease of the accuracy achieved by the classification model.
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